The development of some COVID-19 vaccines by private companies like Moderna and Sanofi-GSK has been substantially funded by various governments. While the Sanofi CEO has previously suggested that countries that fund this development ought to be given some priority, this suggestion has not been taken seriously in the literature. Considerations of nationalism, sustainability, need, and equitability have been more extensively discussed with respect to whether and how much a country is entitled to advance purchase orders of the vaccine under conditions (...) of absolute scarcity. Yet, little attention has been paid to whether prior investment into developing a vaccine entitles a country to some priority with respect to these orders. Moreover, while not a majority view, some survey results show that a significant minority of the populace does endorse some view like this. This article argues that the minority have a point: recognizing funder countries some priority is justified by the weak Lockean claim (WLC). According to the WLC, the fact that someone has contributed to the development of something gives them some entitlement to the resultant product. This article will defend the WLC, and address objections to the argument, including those pertaining to questions of historical injustice and medical need. This argument does not imply an unconstrained entitlement. Rather, contribution to development is one morally relevant factor that must be tempered by and weighed against potentially more substantial claims to priority based on need, equity, and other considerations. (shrink)

This article explores the extent to which income inequality and income mobility—both considered indicators of economic inequality and conditions of formal regulatory institutions —facilitate or constrain the emergence of social entrepreneurship. Using 77,983 individual-level responses obtained from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor survey of 26 countries, and supplementing with country-level data obtained from the Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum, our results from multilevel analyses demonstrate that country-level income inequality increases the likelihood of individual-level engagement in social entrepreneurship, while (...) income mobility decreases this likelihood. Further, income mobility negatively moderates the influence of income inequality on social entrepreneurship, such that the condition of low income mobility and high income inequality is a stronger predictor of social entrepreneurship. We discuss implications and limitations of our study, and we suggest avenues for future research. (shrink)

This paper argues that one problem that besets black-box AI is that it lacks algorithmic justifiability. We argue that the norm of shared decision making in medical care presupposes that treatment decisions ought to be justifiable to the patient. Medical decisions are justifiable to the patient only if they are compatible with the patient’s values and preferences and the patient is able to see that this is so. Patient-directed justifiability is threatened by black-box AIs because the lack of rationale provided (...) for the decision makes it difficult for patients to ascertain whether there is adequate fit between the decision and the patient’s values. This paper argues that achieving algorithmic transparency does not help patients bridge the gap between their medical decisions and values. We introduce a hypothetical model we call Justifiable AI to illustrate this argument. Justifiable AI aims at modelling normative and evaluative considerations in an explicit way so as to provide a stepping stone for patient and physician to jointly decide on a course of treatment. If our argument succeeds, we should prefer these justifiable models over alternatives if the former are available and aim to develop said models if not. (shrink)

The Uniqueness Thesis (U), according to Richard Feldman and Roger White, says that for a given set of evidence E and a proposition P, only one doxastic attitude about P is rational given E. Luis Rosa has recently provided two counterexamples against U which are supposed to show that even if there is a sense in which choosing between two doxastic attitudes is arbitrary, both options are equally and maximally rational. Both counterexamples work by exploiting the idea that ‘ought implies (...) can’ and trying to spell out situations in which some inferences are beyond the capabilities of some reasoners. I argue that on a descriptive account of doxastic rationality, questions of whether ‘epistemic ought implies can’ can be bracketed and that at least one of the inferential moves that Rosa describes in his cases is irrational. I further argue that a descriptive account of doxastic rationality is the appropriate notion of rationality that is to be considered when evaluating U. If my argument for a descriptive account of rationality is successful, then we have reason to revise our use of the term rationality to fit this descriptive understanding. (shrink)

The development of some COVID-19 vaccines by private companies like Moderna and Sanofi-GSK has been substantially funded by various governments. While the Sanofi CEO has previously suggested that countries that fund this development ought to be given some priority, this suggestion has not been taken seriously in the literature. Considerations of nationalism, sustainability, need, and equitability have been more extensively discussed with respect to whether and how much a country is entitled to advance purchase orders of the vaccine under conditions (...) of absolute scarcity. Yet, little attention has been paid to whether prior investment into developing a vaccine entitles a country to some priority with respect to these orders. Moreover, while not a majority view, some survey results show that a significant minority of the populace does endorse some view like this. This article argues that the minority have a point: recognizing funder countries some priority is justified by the weak Lockean claim (WLC). According to the WLC, the fact that someone has contributed to the development of something gives them some entitlement to the resultant product. This article will defend the WLC, and address objections to the argument, including those pertaining to questions of historical injustice and medical need. This argument does not imply an unconstrained entitlement. Rather, contribution to development is one morally relevant factor that must be tempered by and weighed against potentially more substantial claims to priority based on need, equity, and other considerations. (shrink)

Despite global warming and climate change remaining top environmental issues, many people do not prioritize the environment. However, religious and spiritual beliefs can influence pro-environmental behavior. Therefore, we focused on understanding how religiosity and spirituality among Christians, the non-religious, and atheists, influence ecologically conscious consumer behavior (ECCB) through environmental values (i.e. egoistic, altruistic, and biospheric) and issue involvement. Using Qualtrics, we recruited a US sample of Christians ( n = 362), the non-religious ( n = 132), and atheists ( n (...) = 84). Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) analyses confirmed the hypothesized model. Overall, the findings suggest that religiosity is related to the environmental values of Christians and the non-religious. This relationship increased issue involvement and positively impacted participants’ ECCB. More importantly, irrespective of religious affiliation, perceived spiritual connection with nature promoted ECCB. (shrink)

Ethics committees like Institutional Review Boards and Research Ethics Committees are typically empowered to approve or reject proposed studies, typically conditional on certain conditions or revisions being met. While some have argued this power should be primarily a function of applying clear, codified requirements, most institutions and legal regimes allow discretion for IRBs to ethically evaluate studies, such as to ensure a favourable risk-benefit ratio, fair subject selection, adequate informed consent, and so forth. As a result, ethics committees typically make (...) moral demands on researchers: require them to act in a way the committee considers ethically right or appropriate. This paper argues that moral demands are legitimate only if publicly justifiable; and as a result, committee decisions are subject to a public justification requirement. Ethics committees can permissibly request for more information, changes to the research protocol or that the research is delayed or even stopped only if these demands are publicly justifiable. This latter claim is in turn justified on the basis that moral demands to φ are permissible only if we are in a position to know that the addressee ought to φ and that we are in a position to know a proposition only if it is publicly justifiable. This argument suggests that ethics committees must consciously and explicitly appeal to public reasons in their decision-making. In cases where public reasons cannot be offered, committees would not be permitted to reject a given study or make approval conditional on an amendment. (shrink)

On the standard version of political liberalism, the exercise of political power is legitimate only if it is justifiable to all reasonable persons. Correspondingly, reasonable disagreement about the moral doctrines underlying a law makes that law not justifiable to all reasonable persons. In this paper, I argue that political liberals are committed to understanding reasonable disagreement as being rational, rather than praiseworthy disagreement between morally reasonable person because other conceptions of reasonableness commit them to an incoherent triad of claims.

Recently, self-fulfilling cases, that is, ones in which an agent's believing a proposition guarantees its truth, have been offered as counterexamples to uniqueness. According to uniqueness, at most one doxastic attitude is epistemically rational given the evidence. I argue that self-fulfilling cases are not counterexamples to uniqueness because belief-formation is not governed by epistemic rationality in such cases. Specifically, this is because epistemic rationality is not just about forming true beliefs, but about tracking mind-independent truths. In support of the latter (...) claim, I offer three arguments, namely that self-fulfilling and non-self-fulfilling cases differ in their phenomenology, in the norms that guide belief formation, and in the way they relate to the evidence. (shrink)

Study on Mānameyodaya of Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭapāda, treatise on Mimamsa philosophy.

In recent years, there have been several high-profile recalls of hybrid products. If consumers perceive a global firm to be responsible for the recall, then it will reduce their brand equity. Therefore, global firms may respond in ethically questionable ways to justify themselves to important stakeholders and avoid blame. Understanding how stakeholders attribute blame for crises involving hybrid products is important to shed light on the unethical manner in which global firms might avoid blame in such situations. The research reported (...) here shows that in a hybrid product crisis, consumers show a bias in favor of the brand company and against the manufacturing company. This bias is more pronounced when the country of manufacture has an unfavorable image or when consumers lack familiarity with the recalled brand. Ambiguous recall announcements by companies that fail to provide a specific and clear reason for the product defect prompt consumers to assume that a manufacturing flaw caused the product defect. As a result, consumers reduce their attribution of blame for the brand company, and thus its brand equity is maintained. (shrink)

Fanon: life in a revolution -- Influences and engagements -- Colonialism, race and the native psyche. Race, colonialism and identity -- The black man's inferiority complex and race -- The dependency complex -- "Mental disorders" and colonial psychiatry -- Colonialism, gender, sexuality. Colonialism and its sexual economy -- Colonialism and sexual violence -- Women, the anti-colonial struggle and the veil -- On violence I: the destruction of selfhood. Colonial violence -- Territory, geography and the violence of space -- Embodied violence (...) and the alienation of the self -- Hegemony, violence and cultural trauma -- On violence II: the reconstruction of selfhood. Anti-colonial struggles and instrumental violence -- Absolute violence, self-realization and humanism -- Decolonization. Black consciousness, negritude and national cultures -- Negritude -- National culture -- Intellectuals, poets and the peasantry -- The intellectual and the masses -- The peasantry, the masses and political organization -- Nationalism and its pitfalls. In the name of the nation -- Fanon's critique of negritude -- A new humanism? The "problem" of humanism -- The liberated postcolonial -- The ethics of recognition -- Collective ethics -- Beyond national consciousness, towards universalism -- After Fanon. (shrink)

Hastings Center Report, Volume 52, Issue 3, Page 31-33, May–June 2022.

Demands for improved access to innovative therapies have prompted a discourse that claims patients have rights to access treatments that may be of benefit, even if evidence that demonstrates safety and efficacy is lacking. This rights-based discourse is grounded in accounts of autonomy and assertions claiming that the state ought to not interfere with the free choices of patients and clinical decision-making. In this essay, we scrutinise these arguments to defend the ethical and legal permissibility of interference in contexts where (...) the uncertainty of benefit and potential for harm creates vulnerabilities that undermine patient capacity for self-determination. In support of this argument, we draw on two theoretical approaches to explore the limits of autonomy in innovative contexts and analyse the legal bases of the rights-based discourse. We then apply this analysis to the case example of stem cell transplantation as an innovative treatment for multiple sclerosis. (shrink)

This timely book examines the rise of posthumanism as both a material condition and a developing philosophical-ethical project in the age of cloning, gene engineering, organ transplants and implants. Nayar first maps the political and philosophical critiques of traditional humanism, revealing its exclusionary and 'speciesist' politics that position the human as a distinctive and dominant life form. He then contextualizes the posthumanist vision which, drawing upon biomedical, engineering and techno-scientific studies, concludes that human consciousness is shaped by its co-evolution with (...) other life forms, and our human form inescapably influenced by tools and technology. Finally the book explores posthumanism's roots in disability studies, animal studies and bioethics to underscore the constructed nature of 'normalcy' in bodies, and the singularity of species and life itself. As this book powerfully demonstrates, posthumanism marks a radical reassessment of the human as constituted by symbiosis, assimilation, difference and dependence upon and with other species. Mapping the terrain of these far-reaching debates, Posthumanism will be an invaluable companion to students of cultural studies and modern and contemporary literature."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Ageing populations are increasing across the world. Many countries are exploring new ways to provide care for the elderly in hospitals, community care and family household settings. Scientific progress in robotics, artificial intelligence integrated systems and increasingly sophisticated software engineering have contributed to innovative developments in care robots in the Asia Pacific regions, Europe and the US. Whilst the use of care robots is not widespread, research is already occurring to integrate wider use of care robots in the elderly population (...) towards improving their quality of life. Developments in care robots for the elderly are valuable yet they give rise to special concerns as they affect peoples’ health and safety. This chapter identifies key ethical and legal issues arising from the use of care robots in the ageing population. Ethical aspects such as deception and trust from care robots are highlighted, which implicate governance concerns ranging from balancing innovations and ensuring user safety to determining the appropriate levels of regulatory oversight and support for developers and market strategies. An examination of these issues provides some guidance for law makers and policy developers in these areas of concern in establishing applicable regulatory direction, responses and governance framework. (shrink)

The transgender population generally faces rights violations and discrimination in their day-to-day lives, which was exacerbated during the recent pandemic. This necessitates close scrutiny from an ethics perspective. Following directives from a 2014 Supreme Court judgement, Kerala became the first Indian state to implement a comprehensive policy to enforce the constitutional rights of transgender people. Despite such positive actions, a basic social tendency not to respect gender diversity has led to discrimination and marginalization. This was very evident during the pandemic. (...) In this empirical work, we have documented the lives of the transgender community during the pandemic wherein they share experiences related to livelihood, interaction with the healthcare system, and acceptance in society vis-à-vis the pandemic. Simply providing third-gender status will not help the gender-marginalized community to grow to their fullest potential and have a better lifestyle on par with others in mainstream society. (shrink)

Orality, literacy, and an epistemic approach tovisual narrative -- Excavating the oral characteristics of visual narrative -- Mapping the literate characteristics of visual narrative -- Between the oral and literate epistemes -- The future of the orality-literacy paradigm, cinematically speaking -- The politics of (re)presentation -- Digital technology and beyond -- Concluding remarks.

Examines extremity as a political and cultural phenomenon in the late 20th and early 21st century. It argues that we can discern a ‘continuum of extremes/extremity’ on which we may locate practices as diverse as Abu Ghraib, extreme sports, biomedical TV series and horror films.

Monitoring of clinical trials is important to ensure adherence to protocol, to safeguard the rights of research participants and to achieve compliance with principles of good clinical practice. Recent regulatory changes in India require Ethics Committees to keep an oversight of ongoing clinical trials including on-site monitoring. In this article, we share the experience of on-site monitoring of clinical trials by the Ethics Committee of a tertiary care, academic and research centre in India. We found a large number of shortcomings (...) in the areas of informed consent, adverse events, insurance and reimbursement, which would not have been detected by off-site document review. Interestingly, many shortcomings were also not detected by on-site monitoring arranged by clinical trial sponsors. We therefore conclude that on-site monitoring of ongoing clinical trials is a highly important activity for Indian Ethics Committees. (shrink)

BackgroundCognitive deficits are one of the core features of major depressive disorder that play crucial role in functional recovery. Studies have explored cognitive deficits in MDD, however, given inconsistent results, especially in mild-moderate MDD. Recently, studies have explored music as cognitive ability in various clinical conditions. In MDD, large focus has been on evaluating emotion deficits and just a handful on music cognition. With growing evidence on use of music based intervention to target cognitive deficits, it is imperative to explore (...) nature of music cognitive ability in MDD.AimTo examine musical and neuro-cognitive deficits in patients with mild-moderate MDD.MethodsPatients diagnosed with mild or moderate MDD and matched healthy controls were evaluated on selected tests from NIMHANS Neuropsychological test battery and Montreal battery for evaluation of amusia.ResultsMDD group performed significantly lower than HC on working memory, verbal learning and retention. Three indices were computed for a comprehensive evaluation. Groups did not differ significantly in any of the indices- focused attention, executive function, learning and memory as well as on music cognition. Focused attention and memory index predicted music cognition in HC and the combined group. Attention alone contributed to 62.1% of variance in music cognition. Similarly, music cognition significantly predicted focused attention.ConclusionIndividuals with mild-moderate MDD show significant deficits in working memory, verbal learning and memory, however, not in music cognition. There exists a significant relationship between music cognition and attention, which could be implicated in use of music interventions to ameliorate cognitive deficits. Limitations of study include small sample size and heterogeneity. Future studies on larger cohort examining musical emotion perception and neurocognition is imperative to have deeper understanding of this debilitating condition. (shrink)

The free energy principle (FEP) portends to provide a unifying principle for the biological and cognitive sciences. It states that for a system to maintain non-equilibrium steady-state with its environment it must minimise its (information-theoretic) free energy. Under the FEP, to minimise free energy is equivalent to engaging in approximate Bayesian inference. According to the FEP, therefore, inference is at the explanatory base of biology and cognition. In this paper, we discuss a specific challenge to this inferential formulation of adaptive (...) self-organisation. We call it the universal ethology challenge: it states that the FEP cannot unify biology and cognition, for life itself (or adaptive self-organisation) does not require inferential routines to select adaptive solutions to environmental pressures (as mandated by the FEP). We show that it is possible to overcome the universal ethology challenge by providing a cautious and exploratory treatment of inference under the FEP. We conclude that there are good reasons for thinking that the FEP can unify biology and cognition under the notion of approximate Bayesian inference, even if further challenges must be addressed to properly draw such a conclusion. (shrink)

The free energy principle is sometimes put forward as accounting for biological self-organization and cognition. It states that for a system to maintain non-equilibrium steady-state with its environment it can be described as minimising its free energy. It is said to be entirely scale-free, applying to anything from particles to organisms, and interactive machines, spanning from the abiotic to the biotic. Because the FEP is so general in its application, one might wonder whether this framework can capture anything specific to (...) biology. We take steps to correct for this here. We first explicate the worry, taking pebbles as examples of an abiotic system, and then discuss to what extent the FEP can distinguish its dynamics from an organism’s. We articulate the notion of ‘autonomy as precarious operational closure’ from the enactive literature, and investigate how it can be unpacked within the FEP. This enables the FEP to delineate between the abiotic and the biotic; avoiding the pebble worry that keeps it out of touch with the living systems we encounter in the world. (shrink)

Explanatory notes on the philosophical position (sidhānta) of Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācārya, and Mādhyamika schools of Buddhist with Hinduism according to Sa-skya-pa scholar.

Predictive processing is an increasingly popular approach to cognition, perception and action. It says that the brain is essentially a hierarchical prediction machine. It is typically construed in a representationalist and inferentialist fashion so that the brain makes contentful inferences on the basis of representational models. In this paper, I argue that the predictive processing framework is inconsistent with this epistemic position. In particular, I argue that the combination of hierarchical modeling, contentful inferentialism and representationalism entail an internal inconsistency. Specifically, (...) for a particular set of states, there will be both a representation requirement and not. Yet a system cannot both be required to represent a certain set of states and not be required to represent those states. Due to this contradiction, I propose to reject the standard view. I suggest that predictive processing is best interpreted in terms of reliable covariation instead, entailing an instrumentalist approach to the statistical machinery. (shrink)

On Yoga philosophy and Siddha system in Indic medicine; by a Tamil Siddha.

Collection of texts on philosophical positions (sidhānta) of Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācārya, and Mādhyamika schools of Buddhism with Hindusim.